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ABSTRACT 
This paper approaches the question of the relations between laypeople and 
experts by examining the relations between common sense and philosophy. The 
analysis of the philosophical discussions of the concept of common sense 
reveals how it provides democratic politics with an egalitarian foundation, but 
also indicates how problematic this foundation can be. The egalitarian 
foundation is revealed by analyzing arguments for the validity of common sense 
in the writings of Thomas Reid. However, a look at three modern philosophers 
committed to the link between philosophy and common sense – Descartes, 
Berkeley and, again, Reid – shows that each assigns very different contents to 
the concept. This raises the suspicion that modern common sense is not only an 
egalitarian element, but also a rhetorical tool with which intellectuals attempt to 
shape the views of the lay masses. The last part suggests that the way out of the 
predicament is rejecting the supposition that common sense is a unified, 
homogeneous whole. An alternative is sketched through Antonio Gramsci’s 
concept of common sense. 
Keywords: common sense, Thomas Reid, Antonio Gramsci, democracy, 
egalitarianism, ordinary language. 
1. Introduction 
The series of popular uprisings that started in various places around the world 
in 2011 – often referred to as the Occupy Movement – brought to the fore the 
old question regarding the potential role of ordinary people in politics. Thus, 
 
† Minerva Humanities Center, Tel Aviv University and The Open University of Israel. 
188  Humana.Mente – Issue 28 – May 2015 
 
for example, the social protest that swept Israel in the summer of that year was 
initiated by a small group of university students, far removed from the 
traditional image of professional politicians or social leaders. It succeeded in 
getting masses of people from various sections of the public involved in 
sociopolitical discourse by creating forums, discussion circles, and of course 
websites aimed at creating a popular basis for the protesters’ demands and 
actions.  
The protest’s opponents tried to play its popular nature against it, 
portraying its young leaders as naive amateurs unaware of the complexities and 
implications of their demands. When the movement grew, the government 
decided to form a team of experts to contain the demands. In response, the 
protesters formed their own team which combined multidisciplinary experts 
with students and activists. Members of both teams announced their intention 
to listen to the public and represent its demands.1 Is this irresponsible 
populism or democracy at its best? What is it that allows an ordinary person, 
who has never studied economics, to formulate demands regarding taxation 
and the national budget? At what point will that person know that she has 
exhausted her ability to judge in this matter, and had better consult an expert? 
One important albeit problematic answer to all those questions is common 
sense.  
Common sense is usually defined as a set of obvious, self-evident beliefs 
and judgments, equally accessible to all.2 Although the concept’s long history 
is often associated with epistemological and anthropological discourses (e.g. 
Lemos, 2004; Stoler, 2010), it is always politically charged ab initio, as it sets 
the beliefs and judgments of laypeople against those of experts, professionals, 
scientists or philosophers, thereby involving a claim regarding the hierarchical 
relations between the masses and the elites. In this respect, the concept is 
charged with two opposite potentials. On the one hand, common sense implies 
that certain things are self-evident, beyond reasonable doubt, and hence has 
clear conservative potential in that it may be used to naturalize existing 
relations of power. On the other hand, it is intimately related to the notion of 
equality, thus having a significant democratic potential in that it can provide 
 
1 For the report of the government’s committee headed by Prof. Manuel Trajtenberg, see 
http://hidavrut.gov.il/ [in Hebrew]; accessed Oct. 9, 2014. For the report by the alternative committee, 
whose education team was coordinated by the author, see Spivak and Yona (2012). 
2 See for example the Wikipedia article on "common sense", which is based on the Merriam-Webster and 
Cambridge dictionaries: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_sense; accessed Oct. 9, 2014. 
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liberal-democratic politics with the philosophical and anthropological 
foundation needed to trust the individual citizen’s judgment, allowing him to 
claim autonomy and oppose traditionalist privileges.  
In a thorough study of the political history of common sense, Sophia 
Rosenfeld (2012) has recently showed how the concept was used to make two 
contradictory kinds of political demands, sometimes even during the same 
period: demands for change, and demands for the preservation of the status 
quo. She traces the way the concept of common sense emerged in the late 17 th 
century as an attempt to deal with the political instability of post-revolutionary 
England by articulating the common ground shared by all members of the state, 
but soon became an oppositional tool in the hands of the people or their 
representatives. Common sense was seen as an apolitical platform for political 
discussions – “everyman’s tribunal”, whose authority everybody respects while 
opposing political parties’ claim to be on its side. To be sure, the duality of 
conservatism and radicalism is never fully resolved: the concept of common 
sense implies a potential for pluralist-democratic politics that is based on the 
views of the masses, but this potential is in constant tension with a demand to 
narrow down the political arena in the name of self-evident truths. This tension 
is captured by the paradoxical figure of the “specialist on common sense”, the 
expert whose field of expertise is that which requires no experts, who claims 
privileged knowledge of unprivileged knowledge. 
The concept of common sense rarely appears in political theory, but the 
dominance of the ideas it expresses suggests that it is always implicitly present 
as a self-evident truism: common sense is part of the common sense of modern 
political thought. Hence, although the story of modern political theory 
famously stars reason, common sense is no extra, as it acts as the source of 
legitimation of the liberal right for minimal government intervention, as well as 
of the individual’s democratic right to express her opinions on public affairs. 
These rights rest on the assumption that every person of common sense is 
capable of reasonable judgment, of telling right from wrong, good from evil, 
etc. This does not mean that every layperson is regarded as a proper arbiter in 
every matter: certain fields are seen as reasonably left to the judgment of 
experts. But from the liberal-democratic perspective every restriction imposed 
on ordinary people should itself be justified by common sense: in other words, 
common sense alone is authorized to limit common sense. For example, Mill 
demands in On Liberty to grant the right “to carry on their lives in their own 
way” to those who possess a “tolerable amount of common sense and 
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experience” (1977a: 270), while in Considerations on Representative 
Government he appeals to common sense to justify denying the right to vote to 
all those who do not possess enough education: “No one but those in whom 
an à priori theory has silenced common sense will maintain that power over 
others, over the whole community, should be imparted to people who have not 
acquired the commonest and most essential requisites for taking care of 
themselves” (1977b: 470). 
In what follows I approach the concept of common sense and the question 
of the relations between laypeople and experts by examining the relations 
between common sense and philosophy. The analysis of the philosophical 
discussions of the concept will reveal how it provides democratic politics with 
an egalitarian foundation, but also indicate how problematic this foundation 
can be and mark the way for a new understanding of common sense upon which 
contemporary democratic theory can rely. First I contrast the traditional scorn 
philosophy pours on common sense with the modern approach that claims 
philosophy must keep in line with it. I then present the egalitarian basis the 
modern concept of common sense attempts to give democratic politics by 
analyzing arguments for the validity of common sense in the writings of the 
18th-century philosopher Thomas Reid. These arguments, which are 
characteristic of modern philosophy, rely on the connection of common sense 
to everyday practice and ordinary language, and are independent of the specific 
contents of common sense. A look at three modern philosophers committed to 
the link between philosophy and common sense – René Descartes, George 
Berkeley and, again, Thomas Reid – shows that each assigns very different 
contents to the concept. This raises the suspicion that modern common sense 
is not only an egalitarian element, but also a rhetorical tool with which 
intellectuals attempt to shape the views of the lay masses. Finally, I suggest that 
the way out of the predicament that results from the importance of common 
sense for democratic theory on the one hand and its dangerous elasticity on the 
other is rejecting the supposition that common sense is a unified, 
homogeneous whole. In order to sketch an alternative I look briefly at Antonio 
Gramsci’s concept of common sense, with which I rearticulate the political 
challenge of the democratic relations between experts and laypeople. 
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1.1. 
Although every use philosophy makes of common sense involves taking a 
stance regarding the hierarchical relations that should or should not exist 
between professional philosophy and the views of ordinary people, the stance 
itself may vary from one writer to the next. Philosophical tradition has always 
been fraught with expressions of suspicion of the masses, whose views are 
contemptuously portrayed as not only false but dangerous. The most 
celebrated and influential representative of this attitude is Plato, whose 
writings – clearly influenced not only by Socrates’ character but also by his trial 
– express persistent disdain of the masses and their opinions, the doxa. This is 
manifest, for example, in Crito, in which Plato has Socrates respond to his 
friend’s claim that “one must also pay attention to the opinion of the majority” 
(1997a: 39), by saying that “we should not think so much of what the majority 
will say about us, but what he will say who understands justice and injustice, the 
one, that is, and the truth itself” (42). The majority, according to Socrates, 
“inflict things haphazardly” (39), namely follow inconsistently trends and 
eloquent speech (see also Gorgias, in Plato, 1997b: 800). Plato charges the 
philosopher – the expert for justice and injustice – with critically analyzing and 
correcting the doxa, thus creating a clear hierarchical difference between the 
prejudiced layperson and the philosopher. This is an expression of extreme 
elitism: it assumes that certain people do not really think and that their views 
are not really theirs, and in that legitimizes the prioritization of the views of the 
few over those of the many. 
However, appeal to the use of common sense of the masses in modern 
philosophy also involves a conspicuous egalitarian moment. Descartes opens 
the Discourse on the Method by stating that “Good sense is, of all things 
among men, the most equally distributed; for every one thinks himself so 
abundantly provided with it, that those even who are the most difficult to satisfy 
in everything else, do not usually desire a larger measure of this quality than 
they already possess. And in this it is not likely that all are mistaken” (1985a: 
111). That is to say, unlike philosophy that strives to point to the deficiencies 
and contradictions of ordinary ways of thinking, Cartesian common sense 
implies the existence of truths accessible to all. This view is not unique to 
Descartes, though: the main stream of modern philosophy accepts the validity 
of common sense, and believes that the scholar or expert should make it the 
starting point for their studies; namely that their conclusions must not 
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contradict certain things that are known to everybody. The modern 
philosopher emerges as the ultimate expert in common sense. As Clifford 
Geertz notes: “Common sense, or some kindred conception, has become a 
central category, almost the central category, in a wide range of modern 
philosophical systems” (1993: 76). 
This modern approach to common sense is at the heart of liberal-
democratic politics, furnishing both the political theories in which common 
sense is not explicitly mentioned, and the political usages of the kind discussed 
by Rosenfeld. Analyzing the worldview behind the modern concept of common 
sense sheds light on the grounds liberal-democracy has for trusting ordinary 
people, as well as on the relations it establishes between the expert and 
layperson. 
1.2 
Arguments in support of common sense are found in the writings of many 
modern philosophers (Lemos, 2004: 1-23), but nowhere are they more 
central than in those of Thomas Reid, father of the Scottish school of common 
sense. Although the first philosopher to turn common sense into a central 
concept was probably Claude Buffier (2009), Reid is undoubtedly the most 
influential philosopher to have done so.3 
Reid’s philosophy was developed in response to Berkeley’s immaterialism – 
according to which the notion of material substance is contradictory, and 
perceivable objects do not exist outside the perceiver’s mind (Berkeley, 1999: 
25) – as well as in response to Hume’s skepticism (Hume, 2011). Rather than 
confronting these views in the philosophical arena, Reid declares that Berkeley 
and Hume contradict “certain principles… which the constitution of our nature 
leads us to believe, and which we are under a necessity to take for granted... 
without being able to give a reason for them – these are what we call the 
principles of common sense; and what is manifestly contrary to them, is what 
we call absurd” (1983: 20). According to Reid, philosophy must accept the 
principles of common sense as its presuppositions, rather than mere beliefs the 
validity of which may be doubted (8). Although Reid writes that the specific 
 
3 Reid himself does not present his arguments in a systematic, orderly manner, and they can be assembled, 
assorted and classified in a variety of ways. For different analyses of Reid's arguments see Greco (2002), 
Magnus (2008). 
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principles of common sense cannot and need not be proven, he nevertheless 
offers some very interesting arguments in favor of their validity: “although it is 
contrary to the nature of first principles to admit to direct or apodictical proof; 
yet there are certain ways of reasoning even about them” (260). Let us now 
turn to Reid’s main arguments, in order to present the way they link common 
sense to the social sphere, and analyze its importance for democratic politics. 
1.3. 
Reid’s first argument rests on the distinction between theory and praxis, 
namely between speculative philosophy and the actual world: Reid argues that a 
view that denies common sense can exist on paper, but its absurdity is revealed 
the minute it is brought into the world. More specifically, Reid claims that it 
would be dangerous to act in accordance with views denying the principles of 
common sense; with regard to Berkeley, for example, he writes that it is one 
thing to deny the existence of the material world within “a philosophical 
inquiry” (27), but a person acting as though material objects cannot hurt him is 
bound to get hurt.4  
The second argument takes the first a step further into the social world: the 
very presence of other people is enough to bring the skeptic back to the 
commonsensical world: the madness of skepticism, in Reid’s words, “is apt to 
seize the patient in solitary and speculative moments; but, when he enters into 
society, Common Sense recovers her authority” (119). A person might doubt 
common sense when reflecting in solitude, but once that person steps out into 
the real world, he has no choice but to conform to common sense, lest he be 
“taken up and clapped into a mad-house” (86). Indeed, Reid notes that except 
for very few examples from ancient times, all skeptics lived and acted in public 
as if skepticism never occurred to them.5  
The anchor the social sphere provides common sense is further expressed 
in Reid’s third argument, according to which ordinary language reflects the 
principles of common sense, which can therefore be learnt and validated by 
examining how people use language. Reid is well aware of cases in which the 
 
4 This, as we will see below, is a complete misunderstanding of Berkeley, who claims that immaterialism has 
no practical implications on everyday experience. 
5 P. D. Magnus interprets Reid as claiming that practical behavior indicates what a person actually believes, 
and that from one's respect for common sense in everyday life we may conclude that they trust common 
sense in every meaningful sense (2008: 7). 
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obscurity of ordinary language is a source of misunderstandings, like the word 
“smell” that in everyday parlance indicates both something external (the power 
of an object to make us sense its odor) and an inner feeling (the sensation 
itself): this obscurity is one of the reasons for doubting the existence of an 
external world, as it leads to the mistaken belief that it is possible to sense 
without an external object being the cause of sensation (25). However, Reid 
does not think such cases are reason enough to doubt the adequacy of ordinary 
language, for in everyday use they are easily disambiguated thanks to the 
context: “every sensible day-labourer hath as clear a notion of this” (ibid.), if 
only because ordinary people simply do not derive the non-existence of matter 
from linguistic ambiguities.  
The absurdity of all philosophical claims that deny common sense, on the 
other hand, is evident in the way their allegedly accurate formulations drift 
away from ordinary language and use words in an inadequate manner (like 
Berkeley’s claim that “objects of sensation” do exist, but are immaterial). In 
other words, the fact that philosophers give words extraordinary meanings in 
an attempt to make their views appear plausible, testifies to the falseness of 
these views:  
If he [the philosopher] means by smell what the rest of mankind most 
commonly mean, he is certainly mad. But if he puts a different meaning upon 
the word, without observing it himself, or giving warning to others, he abuses 
language and disgraces philosophy, without doing any service to truth: as if a 
man should exchange the meaning of the words daughter and cow, and then 
endeavor to prove to his plain neighbour, that his cow is his daughter, and his 
daughter his cow (26). 
Unlike Humpty Dumpty, then, the philosopher cannot make a word mean just 
what he chooses it to mean (Carroll, 2005: 60) – his professional expertise 
does not authorize him to alter the language that is normally used by 
everybody. Problems of ordinary language do not prevent the common people 
from understanding their world and act successfully within it. This real-life 
effectiveness of ordinary language is for Reid the crucial evidence for its 
adequacy. Hence all common languages reflect the common sense of mankind 
and demonstrate its validity.6 In other words, our ability to understand each 
 
6 “…the general principle – that every distinction which is found in the structure of a common language, is a 
real distinction, and is perceivable by the common sense of mankind – this I hold for certain, and have made 
frequent use of it... I believe the whole system of metaphysics, or the far greater part, may be brought out of 
it; and next to accurate reflection upon the operations of our own minds, I know nothing that can give so 
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other and cooperate in public means that ordinary language can be a source for 
learning the principles of common sense.  
This argument rests, therefore, on the acknowledgment that philosophical 
claims, just like any other claims, have to be formulated in language and 
understood by others, be they philosophers or laypersons. Here, Reid captures 
a point that would become central for 20th-century analytic philosophy: the 
bounds of meaning, which are also the bounds of reasonable thought, are 
congruent with those of common language. This does not mean that Reid 
believes that language precedes thought and determines it, but the linguistic 
stance Reid expresses, albeit not systematically, reveals extraordinary 
sensitivity to at least two essential characteristics of language: language is a 
practice, and this practice is inherently public.7 According to this view the 
ultimate philosopher, the expert in common sense par excellence, is the 
philosopher of ordinary language – who accepts it as given and analyzes it 
either theoretically or empirically in order to study common sense and draw 
philosophical conclusions from it. 
1.4. 
We can now tie together Reid’s arguments and see them as expressing the 
same argumentative logic. This logic establishes an essential link between two 
claims: first, that there are certain obvious things that everybody knows; and 
second, that if something is to be comprehensible in the public sphere, it must 
meet certain basic conditions upon which every common action rests – be it 
linguistic or not. Common sense is therefore not a random collection of 
principles or beliefs, but may be deduced from people’s ability to act in the real 
world, as well as from the interactions between them, namely their ability to 
cooperate and understand each other.  
This sheds light on common sense’s function as supporting egalitarian 
politics and liberal democracy and the rights it confers on ordinary people. It 
establishes the assumption that people are capable of functioning properly in 
                                                                                                                                        
much light to the human faculties as a due consideration of the structure of language”. Quoted in Jensen 
1979: 361. 
7 Reid is the first to attach such great importance to language in philosophy, foreshadowing 20th century 
philosophers like G. E. Moore, Ludwig Wittgenstein and J. L. Austin. See Jensen (1979) and Greco (2002).  
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the sociopolitical sphere on the fact that they actually function there – as 
indicated by their ability to speak meaningfully and act reasonably in everyday 
life. In other words, liberal democracy grants the right to speak based on the 
ability to speak, and the right to act based on the ability to act: one’s ability to 
speak and act normally testifies to their ability to tell right from wrong, proper 
from improper. The philosophy of common sense thus plays an essential role in 
drawing the borders of meaningful speech and reasonable behavior, thereby 
purging the public sphere from disturbances that might turn into political 
deviations: it protects the relative stability of words used in ordinary language 
and constitute a linguistic space of shared meanings and values that provides 
liberal-democratic discourse with an irrefutable foundation. 
Reid’s arguments by no means suffice to defeat skepticism: the skeptic 
might dismiss the dangers involved in his behavior as imaginary, resist the 
social pressure, and simply refuse to present his claims in public. But even if 
the arguments fail to achieve their philosophical goal, they certainly achieve 
their political one: they make it clear that every public action must concur with 
common sense or else be meaningless. The philosopher may reject common 
sense, and theoretically he may be right, but the political agent cannot: politics 
is public by nature, and every action or speech must be meaningful to others in 
order to be effective. Reid’s argumentation, therefore, not only founds the 
liberal and democratic rights of the masses, but also demonstrates the need for 
democratic politics to make sense to them. 
These conclusions seem to contradict the historical evidence of the 
dynamism of common sense in both the epistemological and political contexts: 
what seemed self-evident in the 1st or 11th century is very much different from 
what seems self-evident in the 21st. Scientists and philosophers, politicians and 
activists, often struggle to change common sense rather than act within it. 
Indeed, 20th-century common-sense philosophy acknowledges the possibility 
as well as the need to change common sense in accordance with new 
discoveries and ideas. It argues that every claim must be open to criticism, even 
if it is seen as a solid part of common sense (Peirce, 1965: 308). However, 
such criticism must itself rely on other commonsensical claims, like a boat at 
sea every part of which can be replaced by its sailors only if most parts remain 
intact.8 This approach, referred to by C. S. Peirce as “critical common 
sensism”, was explained by A. J. Ayer as follows: 
 
8 The metaphor is borrowed from Neurath (1983). 
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What the metaphysician would like to do is take up a position outside any 
conceptual system: but that is not possible. The most that he can hope to 
achieve is some modification of the prevailing climate... But if such a venture is 
even to be intelligible... it must have at least a rough correspondence to the way 
in which things are ordinarily conceived. Thus if a philosopher is to succeed... 
in altering or sharpening our vision of the world, he cannot leave common 
sense too far behind him (Ayer, 1969: 81). 
This point clearly applies to politics as well: every moral or political belief is 
open to change, and transforming common sense may be one of the most 
important tasks of democratic politics; such action, however, must only 
challenge some parts of common sense while firmly resting on others.  
2.  
As endorsed by modern philosophers such as Reid, common-sense proves the 
validity of the vast majority of popular beliefs and judgments, and provides 
liberal-democratic politics with a solid egalitarian foundation. However, the 
arguments elaborated above are independent of the concrete contents of 
commonsensical beliefs and principles. Needless to say, philosophers take the 
contents to be self-evident, the acceptance of which follows from recognizing 
the validity of common sense. But a closer look shows that different 
philosophers, even around the same period, ascribed very different contents to 
common sense. Let us now see how three philosophers of the 17 th and 18th 
centuries – Descartes, Reid and Berkeley (presented here in a non-
chronological order) – insist their philosophies are in line with the common 
sense of the masses but make very different claims regarding its substantive 
contents. 
This will naturally have interesting implications for the connection between 
common sense and egalitarian politics, and particularly the relations of experts 
and laypeople: the modern philosopher, the expert of common sense, 
presumes to work in accord with or even in service of the layperson. But every 
philosopher defines common sense in a way that suits her own philosophical 
interests. Every expert of common sense respects the lay masses, but imagines 
them from his perspective instead of actually listening to them. This raises the 
suspicion that common sense is used by the philosophers for rhetorical 
purposes, to appear as though they are on the people’s side while attempting to 
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dictate to the masses how they are supposed to think and act. At the very least, 
the egalitarian trend committed to common sense and the one despising the 
commonsensical layperson are two moments coexisting not only in the same 
period but also in the very same thinker: the concept of common sense itself 
invites the establishment of hierarchies while at the same time challenging 
them. 
2.1.  
Cartesian philosophy is marked by the attempt to free itself from the yoke of 
traditional authorities. The challenge Descartes poses to the received 
intellectual and social hierarchies is based on common sense, defined as a 
cognitive faculty shared by all human beings, cutting across the various natural 
and social differences between them. This common sense – referred to as 
either le bon sens or lumière naturelle (natural light) – is a leitmotiv running 
through Cartesian philosophy, marking the starting point of philosophy as an 
egalitarian moment, blind to the differences between everyday thinking and 
philosophical knowledge. With this concept, Descartes attempts to rethink not 
only the contents and origins of philosophy, but also the identity and 
qualifications of those authorized to practice it.  
In his unfinished The Search for Truth by Means of the Natural Light, 
Descartes presents an imaginary conversation in which Eudoxus (“one of 
sound judgment”), who serves as mouthpiece for Descartes’ views, proves to 
his interlocutors – the scholar Epistemon (“knowledgeable”), and Polyander 
(“everyman”), described as someone who “has never studied at all” – that “a 
man with a good mind, even one brought up in a desert and never illuminated 
by any light but the light of nature, could not have opinions different from ours 
if he carefully weighted all the same reasons” (Descartes, 1984b: 405). 
Descartes’ reservations about esoteric scholasticism and his support of 
epistemic egalitarianism are evident in the fact that the ideal participant in the 
philosophical discussion brings with him as little previous knowledge as 
possible, and must be equipped only with “natural light,” which the essay’s 
title guarantees is the proper means for attaining truth. 
The clarity of natural light distinguishes it from reason, and provides it with 
an evident, hence solid, starting point. The division of labor between common 
sense and reason is clarified in the Meditations, where Descartes uses his 
reason to doubt everything that is uncertain, and then extricates himself from 
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the abyss of uncertainty by means of the natural light which is immune to every 
reasonable doubt (1984a: 27). The complex move Descartes makes in the 
Meditations, which involves not only intellectual challenges but also significant 
psychological difficulties (15-16), rests on that common, minimal cognitive 
faculty of which he says, echoing the opening sentence of the Discourse, that 
“I have no cause for complaint on the grounds that the power of understanding 
or the natural light which God gave me is no greater than it is” (42). The 
considerations raised throughout the Meditations are clearly ones every person 
can, perhaps should, be able to understand and reproduce – the voice 
Descartes adopts when writing in the first person is that of common sense, of 
Polyander. However, we must not identify it with the actual layperson of his 
time. The methodical doubt Descartes casts in the first meditation applies to 
what he calls “my opinions” (12), which include not only complex theories 
known to scholars alone but also the simplest beliefs about the natural and 
social world. Descartes eventually proves most of these to be true, but calling 
them into even tentative doubt is bound to seem to the non-philosopher as the 
complete opposite of common sense, indicating that what laypeople take to be 
self-evident truths are not necessarily common sense according to Descartes. 
Indeed, the fact that all humans are endowed with common sense that 
enables them to attain certain, clear and distinct truths, by no means implies 
that no-one can err, or even that most people don’t. In fact, the lion’s share of 
humanity is often misled by prejudices or “preconceived opinions” that blur 
the natural light (Descartes, 1985b: 209; see also Morris, 1973). Descartes’ 
mistrust of the scholars of his time, and his challenge to the traditional 
hierarchy between intellectuals and the laypeople, in no way give credit to the 
uneducated masses (see Descartes, 1984a: 21). The common, everyday beliefs 
held by scholars and laypeople alike are therefore the object rather than the 
tool of examination and critique (Frankfurt, 2007: 15). The advantage of the 
lay over the educated, according to Descartes, lies at most in their greater 
willingness to listen to the voice of common sense, but it by no means derived 
from their views. Put differently, Descartes turns his concept of common sense 
against the doxa, the common opinion that is commonly referred to as common 
sense. This means that there is nothing “natural” about the Cartesian 
layperson and the light that is supposed to guide him: they are both rhetorical 
figures crafted by the philosopher to provide an elegant solution to the 
problems reason becomes entangled with; and both are quite remote from what 
Descartes thinks of ordinary people and their ways of thinking. 
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2.2.  
Let us now return to Reid, whose arguments for the validity of common sense 
we have examined earlier. As we have seen, the egalitarian moment plays an 
important role in Reid’s criticism of skeptical philosophy, which he identifies 
with intellectual haughtiness. Reid explicitly declares his inability to find faults 
in the philosophical arguments of Berkeley and Hume, but claims that the 
obvious falseness of their conclusions is evidence enough that they rely on false 
premises. The most important premise in these philosophical systems, 
according to Reid, originates with Descartes – it is the belief that we do not 
perceive objects directly but rather through the mediation of ideas which exist 
in the mind (Descartes, 1984b: 27). Berkeley, who shares this belief, claims it 
is impossible to compare a mental idea with an extra-mental origin, and 
concludes that the concept of matter is self-contradictory (Berkeley, 1999: 
27); but according to Reid this conclusion should be regarded as a reductio ad 
absurdum of the starting point (Reid, 1983: 20-1). The important point is that 
the “theory of ideas”, identified by Reid as the point where modern philosophy 
deviates from the course of common sense, is presented by Descartes as a view 
that expresses the beliefs of the masses, and has been accepted in modern 
philosophy as an evident truth in no need of justification. Reid, therefore, 
endorses the Cartesian mission of standing knowledge on solid foundations, 
but what is clear and self-evident to Descartes he takes to be contrary to 
common sense. 
Like Descartes, Reid locates common sense in the individual, claiming that 
it is “a part of the furniture which nature hath given to the human 
understanding” (1983: 118); at the same time Reid, even more than 
Descartes, fears that the ascription of common sense to every person could 
undermine the foundations of society.9 He is preoccupied with explaining how 
some people fail to acknowledge common sense and behave accordingly. The 
main reason people think or act in an absurd non-commonsensical manner, 
according to Reid, is madness – a “disorder in the constitution” (118) that 
does not allow the patient to use his brain properly. However, Reid does not 
attempt to define madness independently of common sense. He find this 
unnecessary, since the borderline between common sense and absurdity, sanity 
and insanity, seems self-evident to him: “how does a man know he is not in a 
 
9 Rosenfeld (2012: 60-89) elaborates on the conservative impulse at the heart of the Scottish school, and 
analyzes the tension between it and the epistemological egalitarianism implied by common sense.  
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delirium? I cannot tell: neither can I tell how a man knows that he exists. But, if 
any man seriously doubts whether he is in a delirium, I think it highly probable 
that he is, and that it is time to seek for a cure…” (18). The limits of common 
sense are therefore determined ad hoc – what seems to Reid far removed from 
the alleged views of society is declared to be insane from the point of view of 
the individual’s common sense. 
Hence philosophy is given the role of revealing the principles of common 
sense and making them explicit. This is because although no sane person 
would deny them, their very self-evidence makes them difficult to formulate. 
Performing this task requires “reflective introspection”, which involves careful 
attention and as we have seen, careful analysis of ordinary language only 
trained professionals can achieve (104-5). Among the principles Reid’s 
analysis reveals are some of the most controversial issues in the philosophy of 
his time, such as the concepts of causality, substance and free will, as well as 
subjects under dispute in the general public like the existence of God. That is 
to say, not every person can simply look into herself and reach valid 
conclusions – reflective introspection is proper philosophy, and its findings are 
worthy of the label common sense, only if they concur with Reid’s views. This 
means that Reid’s criticism of intellectual elitism, as well as his praise of 
ordinary people, turn out to be quite the opposite: his appreciation for the lay 
and for their way of thinking is conditioned by the demand that their views be 
in line with what he takes to be common sense. At the same time, the 
introspection aimed at revealing common sense is a process only a trained 
philosopher like Reid can accomplish. Thus it would seem that like Descartes, 
Reid also tailors common sense to suit his needs – in this case, protecting 
society from skeptical philosophy. 
2.3.  
A look at the writings of Berkeley, one of the philosophers Reid accuses as 
dangerous skeptics, will demonstrate the force of the demand, in the 18 th 
century, to fit philosophy to common sense, and at the same time, the 
variability of the specific characterization of common sense. In Principles of 
Human Knowledge, Berkeley explicitly argues that not only does 
immaterialism by no means conflict with ordinary thought and action, but that 
it accounts for them better than the materialist view. Already in the opening 
sentences, he voices his preference for common sense over skeptical 
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philosophy which seems to him – just as it would to Reid a few decades later – 
to be not only theoretically false but also a source of psychological difficulties: 
Philosophy being nothing else but the study of wisdom and truth, it may with 
reason be expected that those who have spent most time and pains in it should 
enjoy a greater calm and serenity of mind... and be less disturbed with doubts 
and difficulties than other men. Yet so it is, we see the illiterate bulk of mankind 
that walk the high-road of plain common sense, and are governed by the 
dictates of nature, for the most part easy and undisturbed... They complain not 
of any want of evidence in their senses, and are out of all danger of becoming 
Sceptics (Berkeley, 1999: 7). 
Immaterialism is presented as antithetical to skepticism not only because 
Berkeley does not doubt the ability to know whether matter exists – he claims 
we can positively know it does not – but rather because the opposite stance is 
in fact the skeptical one. That is to say, Berkeley thinks that the view that 
accepts the existence of matter is not the popular view of the lay masses, but a 
philosophical error which is responsible for “several difficult and obscure 
questions, on which abundance of speculation hath been thrown away” (61) – 
pseudo-problems that will surely disappear as soon as the concept of matter is 
gotten rid of (28). He is certain that with the exception of philosophers and 
those influenced by them, whoever considers the question will realize that they 
have no need for the concept of matter in the first place (26). This view is also 
manifested in Three Dialogues, in which the two interlocutors – Philonous 
(“lover of spirit”), and Hylas (from ὕλη, “matter”), the uneducated layman who 
abhors skepticism – declare complete loyalty to common sense (1999: 108).  
It is easy to see that what Berkeley calls common sense, or the views of the 
“uneducated”, is quite different from what Reid and Descartes took it to be. All 
three, just like the vast majority of modern philosophers, are in complete 
agreement that philosophy must not contradict the dictates of common sense; 
they strongly differ, however, with respect to what these dictates exactly are. 
None of them, as it turns out, has given much consideration to what the masses 
actually think. And why should they, if the masses are bound to fall prey to 
prejudices no less than philosophers? In other words, each of them molds 
common sense in a way that suits his philosophical views, and they all do so by 
declaring that their philosophical views are derived from common sense. The 
reversal of old hierarchies and the promise of epistemic egalitarianism is in this 
sense merely a pretense: common sense is nothing but another tool with which 
the scholar imagines the masses, dictating to them how they ought to think. 
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3.  
We have seen that democratic politics is committed to common sense and 
supported by it, but that the concrete contents given to common sense vary 
according to the philosophical – in fact the political – interests of whoever 
applies this term. This raises a political question: can common sense provide 
politics with an egalitarian foundation, or is it always open for manipulation by 
experts who consider themselves authorized to speak in its name? It is 
possible, of course, that only some of the contents given to the concept of 
common sense by those defining it are wrong, while others faithfully reflect 
common social assumptions. The philosophers of the 17th and 18th centuries 
may have asked too much of common sense, while it is wiser to limit it to a 
small number of very general beliefs. This conclusion can perhaps be extracted 
from G. E. Moore’s discussions of common sense, in which he lists 
propositions like “there exists at present a living human body, which is my 
body” and “the earth had existed for many years before by body was born” 
(1959: 33). But even Moore’s assertions are not necessarily uncontroversial 
(Berkeley, for one, rejected the existence of material body and world), and 
more importantly, as Nicholas Rescher clearly indicates, the more secure 
beliefs are, the less informative they are (2005, 137-8). Hence an indubitable 
common sense would be too vague and indefinite to provide politics with a 
solid foundation.  
I suggest, therefore, a different answer to the political question. This 
answer rests on rejecting the presuppositions underlying Reid’s argumentation 
for the validity of common sense, and reformulating the arguments in a way that 
articulates the challenge facing egalitarian politics regarding the relations of 
experts and laypeople. 
3.1.  
Reid’s arguments rest on the presupposition that people do indeed understand 
one another, and normally manage to coordinate their actions. Mistakes and 
misunderstandings are regarded as rare exceptions that can simply be ignored. 
That is to say, Reid assumes that all meanings in the social sphere are shared in 
the same way by everybody; objective reality, the intersubjective sphere, and 
common, everyday language all amount to a closed realm of perceptions, 
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meanings, and practices that determine that which is apprehensible, 
perceivable and reasonable. The arguments in support of common sense are 
therefore inherently tied to a presupposed unified community of speech and 
action, in which all adult, sane individuals take equal part. 
However, the social fact of cooperation and communication does not 
necessarily imply a unified, homogeneous social sphere. People can 
understand each other and live their everyday life together even if not 
everybody can understand everybody else all the time, and even if some or all 
meanings are shared only by some. Thus, while common sense is necessary for 
social existence, there is no need to assume the existence of a single common 
sense throughout the social sphere – there may be a heterogeneous plurality of 
“common senses”, coexisting and making possible many different forms of 
communication and cooperation, not necessarily understood by all. This 
understanding of the social sphere – much different from the one relied upon 
by modern philosophy – can be found in Antonio Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks. 
3.2.  
In his prison cell, Gramsci ponders the reasons for the failure of communist 
revolution in Italy, and concludes that Marxism was unable to collaborate with 
the masses and bring them into consciousness of their own objective interests, 
since it failed to understand the complex way in which they comprehended 
their world and gave it meaning. Gramsci believes that orthodox Marxism’s 
assumption that the ideological worldview is completely false, and that all its 
elements contradict the real interests of the proletariat and only legitimize 
capitalist relations of power is simplistic and misleading, since the uneducated 
masses are not completely blind to their reality. He uses the concept of 
common sense (senso comune) to articulate a richer, more accurate 
understanding of the worldview of the masses, one that will hopefully be able to 
suggest intersections between it and the Marxist worldview, thereby helping to 
engage them in revolutionary action. 
Gramsci is well aware of the uncritical manner in which common sense is 
acquired, and of the fact that many of its elements justify and perpetuate class 
domination. His version of the concept, which allows him to recruit it in the 
service of critical theory and revolutionary politics, is based on the insight that 
the worldview of the masses is not at all a unified, coherent whole, but rather a 
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heterogeneous ensemble of perceptions, ideas, customs and prejudices that 
have very different origins:  
When one’s conception of the world is not critical and coherent but disjointed 
and episodic, one belongs simultaneously to a multiplicity of mass human 
groups. The personality is strangely composite: it contains Stone Age elements 
and principles of more advanced science, prejudices from all past phases of 
history at the local level and intuitions of a future philosophy which will be that 
of a human race united the world over (2005: 325). 
Not all aspects of this ensemble reflect the prevailing relations of production 
and domination. Some of them represent a critical understanding of reality, 
which has genuine revolutionary potential (Manders, 2006). Gramsci calls 
these subversive elements of common sense “good sense” (buon senso): “this 
is the healthy nucleus that exists in ‘common sense’, the part of it which can be 
called ‘good sense’“ (239). Marxism, which Gramsci refers to as “the 
philosophy of praxis,” must therefore apply good sense to the struggle against 
common sense: “philosophy is criticism and the superseding of religion and 
common-sense. In this sense it coincides with ‘good’ as opposed to ‘common’ 
sense” (327).  
Note that such understanding of common sense implies an entirely new 
understanding of the sociocultural and linguistic sphere that makes everyday 
cooperation possible. According to this new understanding society is in fact an 
incoherent plurality of unreconciled yet coexistent discursive fields: “There is 
not just one common-sense, for that too [like religion] is a product of history… 
religion and common-sense cannot constitute an intellectual order, because 
they cannot be reduced to unity and coherence even within an individual 
consciousness, let alone collective consciousness” (327); common sense “is 
the ‘folklore’ of philosophy, and, like folklore, it takes countless different 
forms... even in the brain of one individual, [it] is fragmentary, incoherent and 
inconsequential, in conformity with the social and cultural position of these 
masses whose philosophy it is” (343). In other words, the entire social sphere, 
just like the individual, is not a unified whole but a split plurality that is never 
identical to itself. 
However, Gramsci ascribes the heterogeneity of common sense to the 
existing relations of domination in society, and claims that a different kind of 
common sense, one that is homogenous and fully consistent, one that will 
reflect an egalitarian, free society, is indeed possible: “to criticize one’s own 
conception of the world means therefore to make it a coherent unity and to 
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raise it to the level reached by the most advanced thought in the world” (326). 
Political action, that is, should use good sense to undermine common sense 
from within, thereby constituting a true, consistent collective consciousness. 
Thus, like that of the three philosophers discussed above, the egalitarian 
potential of Gramscian thought also falls apart: by assuming the possible 
existence of true consciousness, which fully understands the social reality, 
Gramsci in fact fails to shake off the hierarchical, authoritarian relations 
between the knowledgeable intellectuals and the lay masses.  
What would happen, however, if we took Gramsci seriously and read his 
discussions of common and good sense as an invitation to think of the social 
and linguistic worlds as incoherent and disjointed? If we further pursued the 
line that takes common sense to be a fragmented field, thereby regarding it not 
as a temporary and undesirable but as a permanent, unavoidable situation? 
After all, the discussion of the origins of the modern concept of common sense 
– in Descartes, Reid, and Berkeley – has already suggested that homogeneous 
common sense exists neither in the minds of individual laypersons nor in the 
social sphere, but rather in the mind of the philosopher, who imagines it and 
tailors it to suit his needs. Such an understanding of common sense would call 
for a rethinking of political action itself, following the direction charted by 
Gramsci’s critique of ideology – and going further. 
3.3.  
Realizing the coexistence of heterogeneous common senses makes it possible 
to reformulate the conditions for political action as well as the political 
relations between laypeople and the experts in common sense (or any other 
field). In line with Reid’s arguments we will say that like every action in the 
social sphere, political action too must appeal to some common sense; but it 
need not make sense to all at the same time, or at least not the same sense. This 
does not mean that political action cannot be democratic and rely on a popular 
basis. The opposite is true: ridding ourselves of the illusion of a total common 
sense enables a fresh understanding of democratic politics and the legitimation 
that comes from the masses rather than the elites. 
It must be made clear that the heterogeneity of common senses does not 
contradict the existence and importance of advanced professional knowledge, 
just as it does not deny the existence of shared popular knowledge (although it 
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may not necessarily be shared by all). Every common sense implies hierarchies, 
and may acknowledge the authority of experts and professionals, whose 
knowledge and experience appear relevant from its perspective. Democratic 
politics appears here as a struggle over which common sense(s) become(s) 
hegemonic, namely be recognized as reasonable and obligating by the majority 
of the political community. This is naturally also a struggle over which experts 
are recognized as relevant political authorities. In this sense, common sense is 
indeed an arena in which everybody is equal: for everybody can take equal part 
in the political struggles determining which common sense(s) are dominant, or 
in other words, under which circumstances the layperson’s opinion can be 
considered relevant and in which that of the expert should prevail. In this view, 
everyone may be an expert in some context, and everyone is entitled to say 
which other experts should be listened to and when. The political challenge of 
egalitarian democratic politics, therefore, is first and foremost to keep the 
plurality of common senses relevant; not to let political space become petrified 
around a single total homogeneous common sense that will determine once 
and for all who is a layperson and who is an expert, who has a privileged voice in 
the political arena and who is only “a man of the masses”. 
This, I believe, has certain important implications for the social protest 
movement that has been taking place in Israel and around the world. One of the 
dominant cries throughout the various protest locations has been the demand 
for a fundamental change of the “system” – a refusal to accept it as self-evident. 
In the terms of our discussion, this cry challenges what is taken to be the 
common (non)sense of capitalism. But if indeed the protest has failed, as many 
now claim, I believe it is because it has attempted to express the voice of the 
popular masses while renouncing common sense altogether. To regain vitality 
and influence, activists throughout the world must look for the plurality of 
common senses, to try to understand the various ways in which different 
(groups of) people make sense of the world, in order to form political 
connections even in places that seem unlikely – between factors that seem to 
have no common denominator – based on communication practices that take 
as common and self-evident only the shared need to oppose the “system.” On 
the one hand, this opposition should be commonsensical enough so as to 
express a clear voice and win wide support. On the other hand, the voices of 
protesters must not be silenced by those of experts, for every particular 
common sense implies the ability to decide which experts it wishes to consult 
with and how. The hierarchical relations between “ordinary people” and 
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experts need not disappear, but become dynamic, and work to undermine 
relations of domination rather than reinforce them. Such uses of common 
sense, I believe, are not self-evident at all.  
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